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Abstract
Competition policy is a subject of often heated debate. Competition author-
ities, seeking to battle anticompetitive acts in complex cases to the best of
their abilities, regularly ﬁnd themselves advised by rival economic theories and
disputed empirical analyses. As a consequence, there is a real possibility that
they may occasionally err, missing true violations of competition law or ﬁnding
ﬁrms liable that have actually done nothing but good competition. In this pa-
per, possible consequences of such imperfect competition law enforcement on
ﬁrm strategies are considered. In a simple cartel setting, it is found that the
incidence of anti-competitive behavior increases in both types of enforcement
errors: Type II errors decrease expected ﬁnes, while Type I errors encourage
industries to collude precautionary when they face the risk of false allegations.
Hence, fallible antitrust enforcement may stiﬂe genuine competition. Moreover,
when enforcement error are non-negligible, competition authorities run the risk
of being over-zealous, in the sense that welfare is best served by an authority
that is selective in its targeting of alleged anticompetitive acts.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Competition policy is controversial and often advised by rival economic theories.
Many contributors to the central debate whether antitrust intervention is a cure for
imperfect competition and ineﬃciency or rather a cause take the latter view as point
of departure. Exponents of what is commonly referred to as ‘the Chicago School’, such
as Robert Bork and Richard Posner, point to a variety of reasons for why one should
be wary of competition policy.1 They stress that it is often diﬃcult to determine in
merger control, for example, whether the alleged signiﬁcant lessening of competition
is really there, and if so, whether there is indeed a net consumer detriment when the
potential eﬃciency gains in mergers are taken into account. Likewise, in antitrust
investigations they would point out that it is no easy matter to disentangle alleged
anticompetitive behavior, such as predatory pricing, and good competition. In par-
ticular also, these scholars express concern for the appropriateness of the enforcement
process. In his now classical monograph Antitrust Law, ﬁrst published in 1976, Posner
warned in no uncertain terms that in his experience antitrust cases are complicated
and costly, yet often handled by
“[t]rial lawyers [that] tend to be combative rather than reﬂective, and
... division’s trial lawyers [that], because they are relatively poorly paid,
tend to be young or mediocre, or to be zealots, [... who, ...] [a]s a result
of neglect of economic principles, ... have fashioned a body of substan-
tive doctrine and a system of sanctions and procedures that are poorly
suited to carrying out the fundamental objectives of antitrust policy–the
promotion of competition and eﬃciency.” (op.cit., pp.231-6)2
In Baumol and Ordover (1985) the concern for government failure is taken a step
further by raising the issue of antitrust institutions being strategically misused as
an instrument of monopolization. The authorities may be seduced to bring spurious
antitrust cases, intended to subvert competition–a “specter,” they say, that is likely
to be “... more than oﬀsetting the contributions to economic eﬃciency promised by
antitrust activities,” and that we “would do well to take steps to exorcise.”3 And in
fact, there now is a substantive literature on perverse strategic ﬁrm behavior in the
presence of an antitrust authority.
The wording that these authors choose is rather strong, yet a reserve towards
competition intervention is found with scholars that are sympathetic to checking
competitive processes, as well. Franklin Fisher, an antitrust veteran in both de-
fendant and plaintiﬀ camps, for example, teaches on the diﬃculty to establish true
anticompetitive behavior that:
1 Cf. Bork (1993) and Posner (1976, 2002).
2 In the recent and extensively re-edited 2002 edition of this monograph, Posner expresses–
albeit in somewhat milder terms–a similar concern for particularly the enforcement process as the
main open problem area in competition policy today. Cf., op.cit., Chapter 10.
3 Op.cit., p.247.
2“Economists and others ought to approach the public policy problems in-
volved in these areas with a certain humility. Real industries tend to be
very complicated. One ought not to tinker with a well-performing indus-
try on the basis of simplistic judgments. The diagnosis of the monopoly
disease is suﬃciently diﬃcult that one ought not to proceed to surgery
without thorough examination of the patient and a thorough understand-
ing of the medical principles involved.” (Fisher, 1991, p.32)
And also some of those who explicitly advocate active government oversight of com-
petitive processes acknowledge that there potentially are serious problems in the
enforcement of complicated merger control and sophisticated antitrust analysis.4
Controversy has, as a result, surrounded the US antitrust practice from the very
formulation of the Sherman Act. Bork (1966) narrates how several senators asked
that men of “superior skill and intelligence,” that thus obtained dominance in their
markets, were to be kept from being made “culprits by the bill.” Early conﬂicting
Supreme Court decisions in the Standard Oil case in 1911 and U.S. vs. United States
Steel in 1920, where in the latter case the court passed overt and clear collusion
by majority vote, paralyzed the Sherman Act until after World War II. Likewise,
in one of the ﬁrst major European Commission decisions, Continental Can in 1973,
the European Court of Justice found on appeal in favor of the defendant. And very
recently, both the US and the EU Microsoft cases pivoted around the question whether
Microsoft bundled Internet Explorer with Windows and Media Player to produce
a competitive product necessary to survive in the viciously competitive operating
systems market, or whether instead it did so out of predatory motives with the intent
to levy its monopoly power.
With so much indication that the enforcement of competition policy may not
be trouble free, the question presents itself as to what could be the consequences of
antitrust cases brought that in hindsight turned out to have had little merit, or worse,
that led to false convictions. Again, conjectures diverge and are occasionally strong.
Harold Demsetz, for example, once quite sceptically wrote that:
“Unfortunately, our antitrust laws are being used to protect competitors
and penalize eﬃciency. Competitive pricing policies, eﬀective advertizing
campaigns, and the eﬃcient management of resources are as likely to run
afoul of antitrust as are attempts to collude.” (Demsetz, 1974, p.183,
italics added)
Others, however, are conﬁdent that enforcement errors are negligible, in particular
that ﬁrms found in breach of competition law did indeed behave anticompetitively.
Comfort then is taken in the various appeals procedures that exist to ﬁlter any judge-
ment errors earlier on in the enforcement chain.
4 Martin (1993), e.g., discusses enforcement diﬃculties extensively in Chapter 18 of his intro-
ductory book in competition economics.
3It is however diﬃcult, and arguably impossible by the nature of the subject,
to obtain systematic evidence of mistaken antitrust convictions. Some indication,
however, may be had from the history of competition policy enforcement. In the US,
this has been a rich source for empirical research and learning for decades. Apart
from various summary statistics, such as time trends, in this literature the probability
of conviction has been studied. Gallo, Dau-Schmidt, Craycraft and Parker (2000),
for example, has a section on the win-loss record of the US Department of Justice
(DOJ) antitrust enforcement.5 From 1955 to 1997, the DOJ won 86 percent of all
individual cases, which the authors celebrate. Interestingly enough, however, the
average is substantially increased by successful criminal cases: 92 percent won, versus
77 percent civil cases, which is attributed to greater investigatory eﬀorts channeled to
criminal cases, as well as the fact that these are hard-core per se violations of which
“the illegality of the practice is clear,” and that dealt almost exclusively with small
ﬁrms, without the means to obtain good legal advice.6
Similarly comprehensive studies on the sixty years younger European Commis-
sion enforcement history of competition law are, to our knowledge, not available.7 In
several isolated EU Member States, national enforcement has been studied. Adverse
ﬁndings in cases taken up by the Monopolies and Merger Commission in the United
Kingdom, for example, are reported on in Davies, Driﬁeld and Clarke (1999). Inspired
by that paper, a preliminary study on the “success rate” of the German Bundeskarte-
lamt is set out in Lauk (2002). These studies suggest that in roughly one third of
the U.K. cases, to one quarter of German competition policy investigations the cases
against alleged violators were eventually found to have insuﬃcient merit. And again,
the more complicated cases, such as vertical restraints other than exclusive dealing,
are found to be least likely to result in an adverse ﬁnding.
A notable singular study on errors in competition policy is Duso, Neven and
Roeller (2003), which is concerned with EU merger control. On mergers, there is
some anecdotal evidence of enforcement errors from the string of reversals by the
Court of First Instance of mergers blocked by Mario Monti’s merger task force in
the end of 2002. The Duso et al. paper uses stock market data to evaluate whether
the EU merger control decisions to allow or block mergers between 1990 and 2002
were correct in hindsight, on the argument that anticompetitive mergers would beneﬁt
parties outside the merger as well, whereas procompetitive ones would not. They ﬁnd
symmetric error margins close to 25%. A theoretical underpinning of the detrimental




7 That is, apart from several partial data analyses, such as an appendix that tables ﬁnes for
infringements in EU competition cases in Ritter, et al. (2000), and the occasional bar diagram in
DG Competition’s annual reports, cf. European Commission (2003).
4There is a distinct literature on the incentive eﬀects of competition policy enforce-
m e n t – i np a r t i c u l a ro na n t i t r u s tw h i c hi sm u c hm o r ed i ﬃcult to police–that extends
on the seminal Becker (1968). Early references on public enforcement are Block, Nold
and Sidak (1981) and Besanko and Spulber (1989). Salop and White (1986), Salant
(1987) and Baker (1988) are among the ﬁrst to consider private enforcement through
the claiming of antitrust damages reparation. Reﬁnements of our understanding of
enforcement eﬀects include Cyrenne (1999), which takes up commitment issues, and
Souam (2001), in which alternative ﬁne structures are studied. Harrington (2003)
considers the dynamic pricing behavior of cartels when competition authorities or
others use prices as an important signal to detect the presence of collusion, and
Briggs, Huryn and McBride (1996) analyses the eﬀects of private damages follow-on
suit for legal strategies in public cases. None of these contributions focusses on the
possibility that enforcement is fallible, however.
The principal problem in formulating competition policy that makes its enforce-
ment open to mistakes is a lack of information by the authorities on relevant data such
as ﬁrm costs, consumer demand, prices, sales, potential eﬃciency gains and possible
collusive agreements. When information is indeed asymmetric, observed production
levels and prices, for example, are imperfect signals. They can be a sign of collusive
behavior with low costs, as well as competition with high costs, for example. When
merger control or antitrust investigations into such industries is costly, it is generally
good for welfare to tolerate modest levels of market power and collusion, particu-
larly in eﬃcient and low-cost industries. Instead, the authority should then commit
itself to investigate ﬁrms in the high cost industry with positive probability. This
w o u l db o t hp r e v e n tt h eh i g hc o s tﬁrms from raising prices above marginal costs and
moderate the collusive behavior in the low-cost industry.8
Although this principal-agent approach to competition policy enforcement intro-
duces the probability of investigation and suit, it assumes that once ﬁrms have been
targeted for inspection, the competition authority is able to determine with certainty
what the situation is and whether or not the notiﬁed merger can be allowed or com-
petition laws have been violated. That is, the authority can err by investigating ﬁrms
that are subsequently found not to lessen competition or to have acted competitively,
or by deciding not to inspect ﬁrms that are, in fact, forming a competition impeding
merger or that are colluding, but screening always lifts the asymmetric information
problem fully.
In this paper, we explore the consequences of investigatory procedures that do
not necessarily reveal the truth about parties’ behaviors. This is done in an antitrust
setting comparable to that in Besanko and Spulber (1989). In a simple model of
potential cartel behavior with asymmetrically known cost types, two diﬀerent kinds
of deviations from the null hypothesis that only ﬁrms that indeed acted anticompet-
8 Cf. Besanko and Spulber (1989), which relates to a literature on a principal-agent approach
to tax compliance, in which comparable optimal enforcement results are obtained–cf. Andreoni,
E r a r da n dF e i n s t e i n( 1 9 9 8 ) .
5itively are successfully prosecuted arise: Type I errors–ﬁnding an industry that is
competitive liable of anticompetitive behavior–and Type II errors–acquitting com-
panies that have in fact acted anticompetitively.9 It is found that the incidence of
anti-competitive behavior increases in the competition authority’s enforcement error,
for two reasons. Firstly, and most obviously, the probability of getting caught when
behaving anticompetitively goes down, leading to lower expected ﬁnes for ﬁrms that
are sanctioned. Secondly, the risk of being sanctioned despite having been competi-
tive goes up, inducing industries to collude as a ‘precautionary’ measure. These two
unambiguous eﬀects reveal that fallible antitrust policy may well stiﬂe genuine com-
petition. More speciﬁcally, when enforcement error are large, competition authorities
run an increased risk of being over-zealous, in the sense that welfare is best served by
an authority that is selective in its targeting of alleged anticompetitive acts. Some
numerical examples illustrate these ﬁndings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section present a
basic model of competition law enforcement. Section 3 then studies this benchmark
situation, in which the competition authority has the ability to determine with cer-
tainty the type of industry upon investigation. In Section 4, the authority is explicitly
given an assessment error margin. Subsequently, in Section 5 the full consequences of
imperfect competition law enforcement are propositioned. Section 6 illustrates these
ﬁndings by means of several numerical examples. Section 7 concludes with a discus-
sion of some possible policy implications of the present ﬁndings and some suggestions
for further reﬁnements of the results.
2 A Benchmark Model of Antitrust Enforcement
Consider an economy with industries that each consist of an equal number of identical
risk-neutral ﬁrms producing a homogeneous product for which consumer demand is
given by a decreasing inverse demand function P (q),w h e r eq is industry output. Each
industry is characterized by the constant marginal cost level θ of the ﬁrms operating in
i t ,w h i c hc a nt a k eo nt h r e ed i ﬀerent values, θ3 >θ 2 >θ 1 ≥ 0.T h ea c t u a lc o s t - t y p ei s
known to the ﬁrms in the industry, but not to the authority, which assigns probability
γi to the event that the industry is of cost-type i–naturally, γ1 + γ2 + γ3 =1 .
Given their cost structure, ﬁrms in an industry have the option to behave compet-
itively, or to collude and reduce output. If they behave competitively, ﬁrms produce
at marginal costs in Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, so that industry output qi, i =1 ,2,3
is on the perfectly competitive level, implicitly deﬁned by P (qi)=θi. Industry eco-
9 There are some results on the consequences of errors in tax auditing, relating them to the
complexity of tax laws and the training of auditors and courts–cf. Kaplow and Shavell (1994).
Interestingly enough, it is found that randomness typically edges tax payers to compliance and
allows audit expenses to be directed better, increasing total tax revenue–cf. Andreoni, Erard and
Feinstein (1998).
6nomic proﬁts, deﬁned as
π(q,θi) ≡ P (q)q − θiq,
are then equal to zero. Note that by construction q1 >q 2 >q 3.10
If an industry colludes, it conspires to produce less than the competitive output. In
order to hide its anticompetitive arrangements from clients, consumers and ultimately
the authorities, the cartel picks the competitive output of another industry type. That
is, a collusive industry of type i earns industry proﬁts π(qj,θ i) > 0 with j>i .11 Note
that this setup implies that there is no possibility for type 3 industries to collude.
Furthermore, notice that we abstract from the much more sophisticated ways in
which competition authorities may detect cartels in practice, such as monitoring
parallel price movements, noting substantial long-term proﬁts or failure to compete for
some buyers, or following leads by disgruntled employees or customers.12 In all these
cases, however, the price strategy followed by cartels seems an important source of
suspicion for either notiﬁcation by interested parties, or government’s own initiative.
Ultimately, that is, cartel detection is driven by the extent to which sustained pricing
above average costs can be kept a secret.13 Do note, however, that since costs are
unknown to the authorities, it is not an obvious matter to use economic proﬁts as a
statistic for cartel detection.
In the absence of antitrust intervention, industry payoﬀs are represented in Table
1, where the ‘×-s’ in the upper-right cells follow from the assumption that an industry
will never produce more than the competitive output corresponding to its cost type.
θ1 θ2 θ3
q1 0 ××
q2 π(q2,θ 1)0 ×
q3 π(q3,θ 1) π(q3,θ 2)0
Table 1: Industry pay-oﬀ matrix without competition law enforcement.
Clearly, without the threat of antitrust intervention, a type 1 industry will produce
q2 or q3–whichever gives it the highest proﬁt–and a type 2 industry will produce
10 It is not important for our results that the economic proﬁts of competing in the industry are
indeed equal to zero. What matters only is that ﬁrm proﬁts (for any costs type) are smaller under
competition than under cartellization. Our qualitative ﬁndings go through when the competitive
benchmark is ‘softer’, as in Cournot competition with a limited number of ﬁrms. One way to think
about Bertrand competition here, therefore, is as a convenient normalization.
11 In the following, issues of internal cartel stability are neglected. A collusive industry is
assumed to be able to sustain proﬁts with no problems under reference to the traditional cartel
stability arguments–cf. Carlton and Perloﬀ (2000), Chapter 5.
12 Cf. McAnney (1991). We thank Paul Geroski for pointing out this issue.
13 Cf. Harrington (2003).
7q3.T y p e 3 industries always behave competitively at zero proﬁts. Also note that
the ranking of marginal costs implies that π(q3,θ1) >π(q3,θ 2). Furthermore, the
following restriction of the variety of eﬀects in our model is convenient. To prevent
it from being attractive for type 1 industries to attempt to collude at the q3 level, we
assume that a larger proﬁt can be obtained from producing q2.T h a ti s ,w em a k et h e
following assumption.
Assumption 1 π (q2,θ1) >π(q3,θ 1).
Note that, since the parameters of competition law enforcement inﬂuence the ﬁrms’
payoﬀs in the following, neither the ordering in Assumption 1,n o rt h ef a c tt h a t
it is known to the competition authority gives the authority additional insight into
the behavior of the ﬁrms. That is, depending on the (possibly fallible) enforcement
regime, type 1 ﬁrms may still decide to produce q3, as will be made explicit below.
Similar eﬀects to those reported on below follow if, instead of Assumption 1,w e
assume the opposite; that type 1 ﬁrms prefer producing q3 over producing q2.
Typically, the collusive behavior of type 1 and type 2 industries runs the risk
of being policed by the competition authority. As demand is common knowledge,
the authority can observe the industry price and output perfectly. Without costly
investigation, however, it has no information about cost types. Consequently, when
the authority observes an output of q2, it cannot distinguish between a competitive
industry of type 2 and a collusive industry of type 1. Likewise, when q3 is produced,
the authority cannot ap r i o r itell a competitive type 3 industry from either a type 1
or a type 2 industry colluding.
In order to ﬁght collusive behavior, we assume that the competition authority
can credibly commit itself to an investigation policy (β2,β3) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1],w h e r e
βi is the probability with which the authority investigates an industry when it sees
an output level of qi, for i =2 ,3. Obviously, there is no reason for the authority to
investigate an industry producing q1, since this output level can only proﬁtably be
the competitive output of a type 1 industry. In the following, it is assumed to be
common knowledge that the authority operates in the way it does. Note, however,
that any uncertainty on the side of ﬁrms as to the probability with which they will be
visited by the competition authority–occasionally suggested as a possible dimension
of competition law enforcement–would lead to ﬁrms perceiving a distribution over
v a r i o u sv a l u e so fβ, which reduces to a point estimate in the ﬁrms’ decision making.
Even if the objective probability of suit and the ﬁrms’ subjective evaluation of it
are initially diﬀerent, they are likely to converge over time when the behavior of the
authority is observed.
Suppose for the moment that if the competition authority decides to investigate
an industry, it learns the industry’s type with certainty. Should it discover collusion,
the industry is found liable of anticompetitive behavior and given sanction. For
simplicity–and in keeping with the static nature of the model–remedies are limited
to a simple ﬁne of size A.I ti sa s s u m e dt h a tA is larger than the proﬁt any industry
8can maximally obtain by colluding–as otherwise deterrence would be diﬃcult to
assure. Note that, since imposing ﬁnes is assumed to involve next to no cost for the
competition authority whereas investigation is not, ﬁne levels should in fact be set as
high as possible. However, in practice for a variety of reasons ﬁnes are bounded: the
Sherman Act presently speciﬁes a maximum ﬁne level of $10,000,000 for corporations,
and the Commission Notice on remedies sets an upper-bound to cartel ﬁnes of 10% of
total associated revenues.14 Many member states apply a combination of a revenue
related maximum and a ﬁxed maximum, where the latter typically binds for larger
ﬁrms. Although European ﬁnes are often much more substantial than those in the
US as a result, arguments to punish ‘reasonably’ apply everywhere. In particular,
competition policy should not have as its consequence the elimination of ﬁrms from
the market through excessive punishment and bankruptcy. Moreover, ﬁrms typically
have limited liability. In all, even though assuming that remedies bite at all may
be strong, assuming that ﬁnes are unrelated to proﬁts seems not. Moreover, should,
in the present setting, sanctions be related to output, this would introduce three
diﬀerent ﬁxed ﬁne levels that would only marginally change the analysis, and have
no bearing on the basic results.15
Given A, the authority’s policy (β2,β3) results in expected payoﬀs for the indus-
tries displayed in Table 2.
θ1 θ2 θ3
q1 0 ××
q2 π(q2,θ 1) − β2A 0 ×
q3 π(q3,θ 1) − β3Aπ (q3,θ 2) − β3A 0
Table 2: Industry pay-oﬀ matrix with perfect competition law enforcement.
Each time the competition authority decides to investigate an industry, it pays
investigation costs K. It is assumed to be the authority’s objective to maximize total
welfare, deﬁned as the expected sum of consumer and producer surplus minus ex-
pected total investigation costs. That is, total welfare for a certain output (qi,q j,q 3),
where qi is the output in the type 1 industry and qj is the output in the type 2
14 The Sherman Act further speciﬁes personal ﬁnes not exceeding $350,000 and three years
imprisonment–par. 2 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. par. 2. European competition law enforcement can
not yet apply personal punishment–which is, however, currently under consideration for the Union
as well as many of its member states.
15 For more on the issue cf. Besanko and Spulber (1989), p.410 and Section VII (A), pp.420-1.
Incidentally, a further argument for bounded ﬁnes in practice derives from the very topic of this
paper: enforcement errors. Since wrongful ﬁning is socially undesirable, a more complete theory
w o u l di n t r o d u c es u c hw e l f a r ec o s t so fl a r g eﬁnes, to conclude on socially optimal ﬁne levels.
9industry, i ∈ {1,2,3} and j ∈ {2,3},i sg i v e nb y
W (qi,q j,q 3)=γ1 (V (qi) − θ1qi − βiK)+γ2
¡
V (qj) − θ2qj − βjK
¢
(1)
+γ3 (V (q3) − θ3q3 − β3K),
in which
V (qi) − θkqi ≡
Z qi
0
P (y)dy − θkqi
is the sum of consumer and producer surplus. Note that V (q) − θkq is increasing
in q for q<q k. Observe that the ﬁnes imposed on an industry do not appear in
the welfare function. This is not primarily due to their ‘lump-sum’ nature: as will
become clear below, these sanctions do aﬀect the behavior of ﬁrms–they are, in fact,
designed to do so. Fines enter, however, as a welfare-neutral redistribution of income
from the ﬁrms to the consumers, given the level of output.
Fully acknowledging the challenges it faces, the competition authority compares
the welfare levels associated with all the diﬀerent enforcement regimes from which it
can choose, taking into account the incentive constraints for the industries set out in
the sections below. Having done so, it seeks to install the competitive regime that
returns highest total welfare by setting its policing and sanction parameters in such
a way that the ﬁrms self-select the socially optimal market structure.
Before moving on to the analysis of optimal enforcement, a ﬁnal remark is in order
here. The issues of commitment to police, ﬁning and the authority’s understanding
of welfare are intimately related. This is particularly relevant as many competition
authorities, for example the Directory General Competition of the European Com-
mission, seem to gear their enforcement eﬀorts towards consumer welfare, rather than
total welfare–or at least towards a welfare measure that excludes the surplus of the
parties that have allegedly infringed upon competition law. In the simple static game
setup we use here to illustrate our qualitative eﬀects, once ﬁrms have conspired to
reduce output and raise prices no additional welfare gains can be obtained by the
actions of the competition authorities–which are costly, so that it would always be
best to decide not to prosecute. Put diﬀerently, the sole welfare enhancing eﬀect of
antitrust enforcement in the present model is the deterrence eﬀe c ti th a sex ante.
Since the cartel moves ﬁrst in setting output, the antitrust policy does not constitute
a credible threat, so competition law enforcement has no teeth. One way to resolve
this commitment issue is to take ﬁnes up as a return in the welfare function–which
is the case when only consumer welfare is considered the objective. In eﬀect, au-
thorities would then maximize the diﬀerence between ﬁne revenues and enforcement
costs. Although in itself this is a fallacy–after all, ideal enforcement would deter
infringements completely and hence not give any such ‘returns’–it solves a funda-
mental commitment problem.16 We choose here to ignore commitment issues, steer
clear of the ongoing discussion on the appropriate welfare standard, and use total
welfare instead.
16 See for a model with ﬁnes as an argument in the welfare function Spulber (1989), pp.570-6.
103 Antitrust with Perfect Monitoring
With the structure of the model laid out, consider the incentive constraints for the
diﬀerent types of industries when the competition authority can perfectly observe
the type upon investigation. Making the usual assumption that when an industry is
indiﬀerent between two output levels it chooses the one most preferred by the com-
petition authority–that is, the highest production level–the incentive constraints of
the industry are as follows. A type 1 industry produces the competitive output q1
only if it expects a loss from colluding, that is if
π (q2,θ 1) − β2A ≤ 0 and π (q3,θ1) − β3A ≤ 0, (2)
as it makes zero proﬁts in perfect competition. It will produce q2 if such is better
than colluding at q3 and competing at q1,t h a ti si f
π (q2,θ1) − β2A ≥ π(q3,θ1) − β3A and π(q2,θ 1) − β2A>0. (3)
Finally, a type 1 industry will opt for q3 if
π (q3,θ 1) − β3A>π(q2,θ 1) − β2A and π (q3,θ 1) − β3A>0. (4)
For type 2 industries, there are only two choices. Either it produces q2 if
π (q3,θ 2) − β3A ≤ 0, (5)
or q3 otherwise. By construction, type 3 industries will always produce q3.
Since type 1 industries can choose three output levels, type 2 industries two, and
type 3 industries only one, there is a total of six diﬀerent type-output combinations
that could potentially materialize. Given the setup of the model, only three of these
can possibly maximize welfare, however–the proofs of all results in the following are
given in an appendix. That is, the authority will decide on its enforcement policy,
seeking to implement one of only three market structures.
Proposition 1 When competition law enforcement is perfect, the authority seeks to
implement one of the following three market structures:
1. perfect competition, with outputs (q1,q 2,q 3), that is, every industry type chooses
the competitive output;
2. partial collusion, with outputs (q2,q 2,q 3),t h a ti s ,o n l yt y p e1 industries collude;
or
3. full collusion, with outputs (q2,q 3,q 3),t h a ti s ,t y p e1 and type 2 industries col-
lude.
11The proposition says that the partially collusive output (q1,q 3,q 3) can never be
optimal to implement. The reason for this is that deterring type 1 industries from
producing q3 also keeps type 2 industries from producing output level q3. Likewise,
outputs (q3,q 2,q 3) and (q3,q 3,q 3) can never be welfare maximizing, because both type
1 industries–by Assumption 1–and the competition authority prefer output levels
q2 to q3.
Among the three policies open to the competition authority, it is to select the one
with the highest welfare. Which one that is depends on the parameter constellation,
in particular on the proﬁts associated with each type-quantity combination and the
probabilities with which nature allocates the three diﬀe r e n tc o s tt y p e s .P r o p o s i t i o n
2 characterizes when each of the outputs is optimal, for variable values of the ratio
between the investigation costs K and the ﬁne A, K
A.
Proposition 2 When competition law enforcement is perfect, there exist well-deﬁned
positive numbers Ψa, Ψb and Ψc,w i t he i t h e ri) Ψa ≤ Ψb ≤ Ψc or ii) Ψc ≤ Ψb ≤ Ψa,
such that:
1. If ordering i) holds:
perfect competition,w i t ho u t p u t s(q1,q 2,q 3), is optimal for K
A ∈ [0,Ψa];
partial collusion,w i t ho u t p u t s(q2,q 2,q 3), is optimal for K
A ∈ [Ψa,Ψc];and
full collusion,w i t ho u t p u t s(q2,q 3,q 3), is optimal for K
A ≥ Ψc.
2. If ordering ii) holds:
perfect competition is optimal for K
A ≤ Ψb; and
full collusion is optimal for K
A ≥ Ψb.
The proposition reiterates, in a slightly diﬀerent framework, the original result
by Besanko and Spulber (1989) that, when competition law enforcement is relatively
costly, it is socially optimal to allow certain levels of anticompetitive behavior. In
particular, the results support the conjecture that low investigation costs make it op-
timal to implement the perfectly competitive equilibrium, whereas high investigation
costs may make the collusive output, in which no enforcement is required, optimal.
The constitution of the critical values, developed in the appendix, is insightful. Con-
sider, for example, Ψa, the critical value of K
A for which the competition authority is
just indiﬀerent between perfect competition and partial collusion:
Ψa =
γ1 ([V (q1) − θ1q1] − [V (q2) − θ1q2])
γ2π (q2,θ 1)+γ3 [π(q3,θ 1) − π (q3,θ 2)]
.
The numerator represents the expected increase in total surplus from deterring a type
1 industry from colluding. The denominator of Ψa reﬂects the costs of deterring type
121 industries. Only when the return from doing so is suﬃciently large, that is, does it
pay to incur the enforcement costs to install perfect competition.
Typically, when the probabilities of the diﬀerent cost-types occurring are reason-
ably symmetric, the ordering of Proposition 2.1 applies. Note, however, that when γ1
increases, so that γ2 and/or γ3 decrease, Ψa increases. The more likely it is that the
authority faces a low cost type, therefore, the larger the region in which it is optimal
to enforce perfect competition at a given cost. Similarly, Ψc, is found to be the ratio
of the increase in surplus resulting from keeping ﬁrm 2 from colluding and the costs
thereof,
Ψc =
γ2 ([V (q2) − θ2q2] − [V (q3) − θ2q3])
γ3π (q3,θ 2)
,
which decreases when γ2 decreases–possibly increasing γ3. Hence, the less likely it
is to confront a type 2 ﬁrm, and the more likely a ﬁrm is of type 3,w i t ht h em o r e
reserve the authority should intervene.
Finally, note that when the only other possible ordering of the regime boundaries,
that of Proposition 2.2, holds, the partially collusive output cannot be welfare maxi-
mizing and the optimal regime changes from perfect competition to full collusion at
Ψb.
4 Assessment Errors
Even though we consider arguably the most simple of anticompetitive acts to discover
and convict–cartels that ﬁx prices, which are per se violations–suppose that the
authority, after it has investigated the industry–possible more than once, when ap-
peals are lodged in initial stages of the case–occasionally draws the wrong conclusion
on whether or not the industry breached competition law and is to be sanctioned.
Let b θ be the competition authority’s inference on the type of industry it faces after
investigation. We are interested in the probability that, upon observing qk,t h ec o m -




b θ = θj|θi,q k
´
for i,j,k =1 ,2,3.
Note that the probability of bringing antitrust cases that indeed have no merit would
typically be a decreasing function of the investigation eﬀort per case, K, of the au-
thority. Since these costs are assumed to be constant here for each case the authority
decides to investigate, however, the probabilities Pr
³
b θ = θj|θi,q k
´
are exogenously
g i v e ni nt h i sm o d e l .
134.1 Antitrust Inferences






b θ = θj|θi,q k
´
=1 .
The possibilities to err are further restricted by the construction of the possible in-
dustry structures. Since only type 1 industries can produce q1 without making a
loss the competition authority will always rightfully infer that the true value of
the cost parameter has to be θ1 when observing production quantity q1,t h a ti s ,
Pr
³








b θ = θ1|θ1,q 1
´
=1 . Likewise,
since a type 3 industry will always produce q3, the competition authority will never
conclude it faces a type 3 industry when q2 is observed, i.e., Pr
³





b θ = θ3|θ2,q 2
´
=0 . We further make the following assumptions to reduce com-
plexity.
Assumption 2 (i) The probability of error is symmetric, that is
Pr
³




b θ = θj|θi,q k
´
for i,j =1 ,2,3 and k =2 ,3.
(ii) The probability of error is constant, and indicated as α, that is
Pr
³













b θ = θ2|θ1,q 2
´
= α.
The symmetry assumption is mildly restrictive. Typically, there is no particu-
lar reason to assume that the competition authority would be able to distinguish
between otherwise symmetric cases. Part (ii) of Assumption 2 is less innocent, yet
defendable–note that (i) is implied by (ii), but we distinguish between them for
clarity of exposition. Part (ii) implies that the competition authority is more likely
to make judgment errors, the more diﬀerent possible market structures can under-
lie the observed quantities. Alternatively put, the more cost types are excluded by
the industry’s revealed behavior, the smaller is the error made by the competition
authority. Assuming the probability of error to be constant seems more appropriate
than its simple counterpart, that is, keeping the total probability of error constant, ir-
respective of the complexity of the industry under investigation. A more satisfactory
setup would allow for diﬀerent probabilities for each possible type of error, with gen-
eral conditions on their relationships. This complicates the notation greatly, without
adding substantially to the strength of the points here made.
14Figure 1 illustrates the various decisions by nature, the authority and the ﬁrms
in an extensive form game. For ease of exposition, the ﬁgure has been reduced to
display only those choices that can possibly be made–that is, those type-quantity
matches that will not occur because it is never proﬁtable to produce more than the
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Figure 1: The sequence of moves by nature, industry and authority.
First, nature (N) decides on the cost structure of the industry. Then, the industry
(I) decides whether or not to collude, after which suit is brought or not, with a
probability committed to by the competition authority (A), and depending on the
observed quantity–note that identical qi’s are each in one information set. When
quantity q2 is observed, and in case of an investigation, with probability α the ﬁrm is
falsely assessed. When q3 is observed, the competition authority can err twice, taking
the industry for a type 2 or a type 3, where it is type 1,f o rat y p e1 or a type 3,w h e r e
it is a type 2,o rf o rat y p e1 or 2,w h e ni ti sat y p e3. This results in the three-way
splits associated with investigation upon observing q3.
15The full matrix of antitrust inferences that results is given in Table 3.
q1 q2 q3
b θ θ1 θ2 θ3 θ1 θ2 θ3 θ1 θ2 θ3
b θ1 1 ××1 − αα × 1 − 2αα α
b θ2 0 ××α 1 − α × α 1 − 2αα
b θ3 0 ××00× αα1 − 2α
Table 3: Matrix of antitrust inference probabilities.
An × refers to an inference that cannot be made given the observed behavior of the
industry. The other entries state the probability with which the estimate as speciﬁed
for the entire row is arrived at when the observed-behavior-true-type-combination is
that of the respective column. Note that each column sums up to unity, and so does
each part of each row associated with a speciﬁc output level.
4.2 Type I and Type II Errors
The deﬁnition of assessment errors and Assumption 2 together imply the probabilities
with which Type I and Type II errors are made. Recall that, relative to the null
hypothesis that it is only ﬁrms that indeed colluded that are prosecuted and found
liable of anticompetitive behavior, a Type I error is deﬁned as “ﬁnding a ﬁrm that
behaved perfectly competitive liable of anticompetitive acts,” and a Type II error is
“acquitting an industry that has in fact acted anticompetitively.” When q2 is observed,
either a type 1 industry is colluding, or a type 2 industry is behaving competitively.
Consequently, the symmetry assumption on the probabilities implies symmetry in the
error types. That is,
Pr(Type I |q2)=P r( Type II |q2)=α.
When q3 is observed, however, the situation is more complicated. Now, there are
three possible states of the world between which the authority cannot discriminate. It
either faces a type 1 or a type 2 industry colluding, or a type 3 industry in competition.
As a result, the symmetry in error types is broken. The probability of a Type I error
is 2α,s i n c ew h e nt h et r u et y p ei s3, the authorities believe it is type 1 or 2 with
probability α each instead. That is,
Pr(Type I |q3)=P r
³








b θ = θ2|θ3,q 3
´
=2 α.
Should the true type be 1 or 2, however, and q3 is observed, the possibility arises
that the authority makes the wrong assessment, yet takes the right action in ﬁning
16the industry nevertheless. That is, an industry can be prosecuted and sanctioned for
anti-competitive acts that it indeed committed, yet on the basis of a false assessment
of its type by the authorities. As a result, the Type II error when q3 is observed is
halved, or
Pr(Type II |q3)=P r
³




b θ = θ3|θ2,q 3
´
= α,
w h e r et h el a t t e ri st r u es i n c ew h e nb θ = θ2 there is (correctly) a ﬁne levied as well.
Hence, since the authorities can ‘get away’ with some of their assessment errors,
in that the action they take based on their false assessment, that is, imposing a ﬁne, is
appropriate, an asymmetry emerges between Type I and Type II errors in the event
that q3 is observed. This is a consequence of the various simplifying assumptions
made above–that there are only three types of ﬁrms, that ﬁnes are independent of
sales and that α is constant, in particular that the authorities are more likely to err
when more possible underlying structures can explain the observations made. Note,
however, that the Type II error we specify is an error made after investigation, and
n o tp r i o rt oi t .I td oe sn o ti n c l u d et h o s ec a s e st h a tw e r en e v e rb r o u g h tt ot h ea t t e n t i o n
of the authorities in the ﬁrst place. Rather, it concerns actual cartels, of which the
competition authority was correct to be suspicious, but that escaped prosecution,
since the authority falsely assessed the industry as competitive upon investigating it.
Nevertheless, a more complete analysis would specify a continuous probability
distribution over the assessment errors that can itself be made the object of policy.
An obvious way to do this it to introduce that when a ﬁrm is found liable, a second
investigation round is entered, with associated costs and room for errors. Such an
appeals system allows for the type of socially desirable sanction level by weighing
the consequences of Type I and Type II errors. Appeals procedures would, in other
words, shift the probabilities for errors between the two error types–obviously away
from Type I towards Type II errors, as it will be ﬁrms that are wrongfully sanctioned
that seek correction. A further discussion of some of the constitutional consequences
of this is postponed to Section 7. In any case, although more sophisticated error
probabilities would be an interesting topic for further research, the present ﬁxed
and symmetric case brings out important qualitative eﬀects. For now, it should be
interpreted as capturing the full investigatory and judicial process through which
competition cases go, including the various appeals procedures that exist. Our only
claim is that at the end of that full judicial process, some error margin remains. That
it here is symmetric and constant is not essential for the results that follow, nor is
the asymmetry in Type I errors when q3 is produced.
5 Imperfect Antitrust Enforcement
When the competition authority, given ﬁne level A, is committed to the enforcement
policy (β2,β3) and it is common knowledge that the possibility exists that a liable in-
17dustry under investigation escapes correction, and an innocent industry is wrongfully
sanctioned, the following expected industry payoﬀ table results.
θ1 θ2 θ3
q1 0 ××
q2 π (q2,θ 1) − β2 (1 − α)A −β2αA ×
q3 π (q3,θ 1) − β3 (1 − α)Aπ (q3,θ2) − β3 (1 − α)A −2β3αA
Table 4: Industry pay-oﬀ matrix with imperfect competition law enforcement.
It is important to note that the assessment errors by the competition authority
have no inﬂuence on the welfare function (1), since misallocated ﬁnes amount to a
random redistribution of income. Here again the remarks made in Section 2 apply.
In particular, the errors are immaterial for society at large, given the level of output
only. There is an important welfare detriment following from the error margin via
the eﬀect assessment errors have on ﬁrm behavior, since the incentive constraints of
the ﬁrms are crucially aﬀected.
When the competition authority observes the industry type imperfectly and in-
vestigation is fallible, industry payoﬀ Table 4 applies. The associated incentive con-
straints (compare to (2)-(5)) are as follows. The type 1 industry chooses to produce:
q1 if π (q2,θ 1) − β2 (1 − α)A ≤ 0 and π (q3,θ 1) − β3 (1 − α)A ≤ 0; (6)
q2 if π (q2,θ 1) − β2 (1 − α)A ≥ max{0,π(q3,θ1) − β3 (1 − α)A} and; (7)
q3 if π (q3,θ 1) − β3 (1 − α)A ≥ max{0,π(q2,θ1) − β2 (1 − α)A}. (8)
Type 2 industries produce q3 if
π(q3,θ 2) − β3 (1 − α)A>−β2αA,( 9 )
and otherwise behave competitively at q2.I n v a r i a b l y ,t y p e3 industries choose to pro-
duce q3. Notice, however, that they do face possible penalties, now, when convicted
innocently.
A ﬁrst result compares the incentives of industries to collude with perfect and
imperfect enforcement of competition law. When enforcement is imperfect, the in-
centive to collude goes up, for any given enforcement strategy, for two reasons. First,
the probability of getting caught when behaving anticompetitively goes down, as can
be seen by comparing the lower oﬀ-diagonal elements of Table 4 to those in Table 2
in Section 2. This decreases the expected costs of anticompetitive behavior. Second,
and more interesting, industries that would otherwise behave perfectly competitive
are induced to collude as a ‘precautionary’ measure, because they run the risk of get-
ting wrongfully sanctioned when in fact behaving competitively. The ‘ﬁne-reduction’
18eﬀect stems from the presence of Type II errors, whereas the ‘precautionary’ eﬀect is
driven by the occasional Type I error.
More speciﬁcally, for a given competition policy (β2,β3),t y p e1 industries collude
under imperfect competition law enforcement, where they would not do so under
perfect monitoring, if the cartel proﬁt π(q2,θ 1) satisﬁes
β2 (1 − α)A<π(q2,θ 1) <β 2A,
in which only the expected-ﬁnes eﬀect of enforcement errors plays a role. Type
2 industries, however, collude under imperfect monitoring and not under perfect
monitoring if
β3 (1 − α)A − β2αA < π(q3,θ2) <β 3A,
so that both eﬀects of erroneous antitrust apply. The expected-ﬁnes eﬀect, measured
by −β3αA,provides an increased incentive to collude simply by lowering the proba-
bility of being caught. The precautionary-collusion eﬀect, given by −β2αA,i n c r e a s e s
the incentive to collude through the positive probability of being sanctioned unjustly.
The set of market structures that can be implemented and is possibly optimal–
that is, the imperfect enforcement analogue of Proposition 1–is given below.
Proposition 3 When competition law enforcement is imperfect, the authority seeks
to implement one of the following four market structures:
1. perfect competition, with outputs (q1,q 2,q 3), that is, every industry type chooses
the competitive output;
2. type 1 partial collusion, with outputs (q2,q 2,q 3),t h a ti s ,o n l yt y p e1 industries
collude;
3. type 2 partial collusion, with outputs (q1,q 3,q 3),t h a ti s ,o n l yt y p e2 industries
collude, which is feasible if
α ≥ α
∗ ≡
π (q3,θ 1) − π (q3,θ 2)
A
; or
4. full collusion,w i t ho u t p u t s(q2,q 3,q 3), that is, both type 1 and type 2 industries
collude.
This largest set of potentially optimal regimes is the same as that identiﬁed in
Proposition 1, with one exception: since collusion is more diﬃcult to ﬁght for the rea-
sons given above–not all oﬀenders are caught, not even when monitored, and inno-
cent ﬁrms run a risk of being wrongfully sued, giving them an incentive to collude–a
ﬁrst eﬀect of imperfect monitoring is that a new optimal situation can occur, in which
type 1 industries behave competitively, yet type 2 industries collude and conspire on
the type 3 production level, provided the government error α is large enough.
19In order to determine the conditions under which each of these diﬀerent outputs
is the welfare maximizing choice of government, consider a second critical value of α,
α∗∗ >α ∗,d e ﬁned as
α
∗∗ ≡
π (q3,θ 1) − π (q3,θ 2)
π (q2,θ1)+π(q3,θ 2) − π (q3,θ 1)
.
The ﬁne-reduction eﬀect pertains to the situation with α ≤ α∗∗. In this case, a result
analogous to Proposition 2 applies straightforwardly, with Ψi, i = a,b,c,r e p l a c e d
by Ψα
i =( 1 − α)Ψi. Clearly, such modest imperfection in antitrust increases the
parameter region in which collusion is socially optimal. This is due to the fact that
not all investigated and liable ﬁrms are sanctioned, and the induction of competition
therefore requires a higher risk of being investigated, hence more investigation costs,
that are not oﬀset by higher detection. The more subtle precautionary-collusion eﬀect
occurs for values of α higher than α∗∗. It leads to an even lower likelihood of the
competitive output being the right objective for competition policy. Proposition 4
summarizes these results and establishes the relationship with Proposition 2.
Proposition 4 When competition law enforcement is imperfect and type 2 partial




c with either i) Ψα
a ≤ Ψα
b ≤ Ψα
c or ii) Ψα
c ≤ Ψα
b ≤ Ψα
a,s u c h
that:
1. If ordering i) holds:
perfect competition,w i t ho u t p u t s(q1,q 2,q 3), is optimal for K
A ∈ [0,Ψα
a];





full collusion,w i t ho u t p u t s(q2,q 3,q 3), is optimal for K
A ≥ Ψα
c.
2. If ordering ii) holds:
perfect competition is optimal for K
A ≤ Ψα
b; and
full collusion is optimal for K
A ≥ Ψα
b.
3. For α ≤ α∗∗, Ψα
i =( 1− α)Ψi, i = a,b,c;a n d
for α>α ∗∗, Ψα
i < (1 − α)Ψi for i = a or b,
where Ψa, Ψb and Ψc are deﬁned in (the proof of) Proposition 2.
Note that the precautionary-collusion eﬀect that further decreases Ψα
i below(1 − α)Ψi
only applies for the cases a and b. That is, the transition from type 1 partial col-
lusion to full collusion as the socially optimally enforced regime is not aﬀected by
it. The reason for this is that in the type 1 partial collusive situation, the competi-
tion authority never investigates when it observes q2. Therefore, neither type 1 ﬁrms
20colluding at q2,n o rt y p e2 ﬁrms competing at q2 run the risk of being falsely con-
victed. Consequently, they have no incentive to collude as a precautionary measure.
The precautionary-collusion eﬀect only applies to the transition from perfect compe-
tition to partial collusion. A a result, note further that the precautionary-collusion
eﬀect observed is not driven by the asymmetry in error types when q3 is observed.
The industry truly suﬀering from the higher probability of being wrongfully sanc-
tioned is the type 3 industry. They have no option than to produce q3,h o w e v e r .
Precautionary-collusion pertains only to the extent that it encourages type 1 ﬁrms to
collude rather than behave competitively.
A second result that derives from imperfect competition law enforcement is the
novel possibility that the type 2 partially collusive equilibrium maximizes welfare.
Crucial in this respect is the fraction of type 1 industries. If this fraction is high
enough, it will pay for the competition authority to deter industries of this type from
colluding, yet let type 2 industries go.
Proposition 5 Let α>α ∗. Then, when antitrust is imperfect, there exists a well-
deﬁned number Γ1 such that for γ1 > Γ1 there is an interval of values of K
A in which
type 2 partial collusion, with outputs (q1,q 3,q 3), is optimal.
For the way in which Γ1 derives, as well as for the borders of the interval in which
the eﬀect applies, see the appendix again. Obviously, if the type 2 partially collusive
output is not optimal, that is, if γ1 ≤ Γ1 and/or K
A falls outside the speciﬁed interval,
the ordering as deﬁn e di nP r o p o s i t i o n4 applies.
6 Three Illustrative Examples
Some simple numerical examples illustrate the meaning of the diﬀerent regimes found.
Suppose inverse demand is linear and given as P (q)=1 0 0−q. Types are known by:
θ1 =0 , θ2 =4 0and θ3 =8 0 .C o n s e q u e n t l y ,q1 = 100, q2 =6 0and q3 =2 0 .P r o ﬁts
corresponding to the collusive strategies are as follows.
π(q2,θ 1) = 2400,π (q3,θ 1) = 1600 and π(q3,θ 2) = 800.
S u r p l u si sg i v e nb yV (qi)=
R qi
0 P (y)dy =1 0 0 qi − 1
2 (qi)
2,s ot h a t
V (q1) = 5000,V(q2) = 4200 and V (q3) = 1800.
The threshold values that segregate the optimal antitrust regimes when α =0











21First, let the diﬀerent cost structures have an equal probability of coming about:
γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = 1
3. Note that α∗∗ = 1
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Figure 2,i nw h i c hα is set out against K
A, illustrates.











type 1 partial collusion
full collusion
Figure 2: Diﬀerent optimal antitrust regimes for γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = 1
3.
When there are no errors made–i.e., on the horizontal axis–the perfectly competitive
output (100,60,20) is welfare maximizing for the competition authority when K
A ≤ 1
4,
the partial collusion outputs (60,60,20) for 1
4 ≤ K
A ≤ 1, and the fully collusive output
for K ≥ A. For positive values of α smaller than 1
4, the straight lines separate
the perfect competition, type 1 partial collusion and the full collusion cases. When α
increases from zero, the perfect competition and partial collusion regions are enlarged
linearly, at the expense of the area in which perfect competition is optimal. This is the
expected-ﬁnes eﬀect of imperfect antitrust. When α>1
4, the straight line Ψα
a curves
oﬀ to the left, thus reducing the region in which perfect competition is optimal, and
type 1 partial collusion is best enforced, more than proportionally from the region
22delineated by the straight continuation of the Ψα
a line–indicated as a dotted line.
For these values, the precautionary-collusion consequence of imperfect antitrust take
eﬀect.
Next, an example where type 2 partial collusion is both implementable and opti-
mal. Take A = 5000, implying α∗ = 4
25. Then, for α>α ∗ an interval of K
A values for
which (q1,q 3,q 3) is optimal exists when γ1 ≥ 2
3 and γ2 ≤ γ1 − 1
2. Consider the case
γ1 = 3
4 and γ2 = γ3 = 1
8. There then appears a transition boundary from perfect
competition to full collusion for values of α below α∗ = 4
25. For high enough values
α> 4
25, type 2 partial collusion can be implemented and a region in which type 2
partial collusion is preferred is found, as illustrated in Figure 3.














Figure 3: Diﬀerent optimal antitrust regimes for γ1 = 3
4,γ2 = γ3 = 1
8 and A = 5000.
Finally, an example where all four regimes can be optimal. This happens, for
example, for γ1 = 3
4, γ2 = 3
16 and γ3 = 1
16.T h ed i ﬀerent regimes are shown in Figure
4.N o t et h a tt y p e2 partial collusion can again only be implemented for α> 4
25.
In all three these examples, the qualitative eﬀect of errors in enforcement are
apparent. When, in Figure 2, perfect competition is the authority’s objective, with
a solid enforcement costs of twenty percent of ﬁnes (K
A =0 .2), this is a ﬁne policy, as
long as the enforcement error remains low. When α comes close to twenty percent,
however, the optimal regime no longer is that of perfect competition, but of partial
collusion of type 1. Likewise, in Figure 3 when investigation costs are, for example,
twenty percent over the level of ﬁnes, so that K
A =1 .2, depending on the error level the
optimal enforcement regime may well pass from perfect competition as the standard,
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A =5 0 0 0 .
to type 2 partial collusion for errors above 4
25, and even full collusion (or type 1 partial
collusion in Figure 4)w h e nα is a little over 0.2.
7 Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
When competition authorities are fallible–and aren’t we all?–it is shown that the in-
cidence of anticompetitive behavior may increase in the enforcement error, essentially
for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that the expected sanction for law breaching decreases,
due to possibility of ﬁrms escaping without a penalty, even when monitored. The
second reason is that ﬁrms that would otherwise behave perfectly competitive are in-
duced to collude as a precautionary measure when they face the risk of being unjustly
sanctioned when obeying the law. The overall conclusion, therefore, is that compe-
tition policy may be counter-productive in that its enforcement stimulates, by the
authority’s imperfect way of policing, the very behavior it was designed to prevent.
Put diﬀerently, imperfect competition law enforcement may stiﬂe genuine competi-
tion. As a result, from a total welfare point of view, more types of collusion are
better tolerated than fought, than when competition law enforcement is ﬂawless. In
practice, therefore, when enforcement errors are non-negligible competition authori-
ties run the risk of being over-zealous. It may even be the case that competition law
enforcement is open to errors to such an extent, that it would be socially desirable
24not to have an authority at all.17
In general, this means that competition policy, where it is costly, is to be enforced
with great care. To make this simple demand to base competition policy in sound




Low Perfect Competition Partial Collusion (type 1)
High Partial Collusion (type 2) Full Collusion
Table 5: Policy regimes under imperfect competition law enforcement.
When investigation is both reasonably inexpensive and eﬃcient, a tough com-
petition authority should seek to install perfect competition as the socially optimal
market structure–as in the upper-left cell. This may be the case at hand in well
established industries, such as traditional bulk production, that are well understood
by industry specialists and where the costs of production are fairly easily monitored.
These industries are known to have a tendency to collude, which should be fought
intensely. When, however, both the investigation costs relative to the ﬁne level is
high and the margin of assessment errors is substantial, society is better oﬀ with an
competition authority that holds back and accepts some social costs of collusion–
the lower-right cell. The reason for this is that the authority’s own detrimental eﬀect
on competition, combined with the higher level of enforcement costs its policing ac-
tivities require, make it a burden on society. Sectors in the economy to which this
situation may apply could well be high-tech fast evolving ones, such as biochemistry,
and cutting-edge hard- and software. Here, R&D developments are rapid, true indus-
try experts with suﬃcient oversight to understand production relationships and costs
are unavailable, and progress may be so rapid that intervention is likely to be oﬀ the
mark with very high probability. In those circumstances, partial, or even full collusion
may be the socially eﬃcient outcome–at least for the time being, until the industry
matures and is better understood. Naturally, the intermediate options of partial col-
lusion, in which some anticompetitive behavior is taken for granted, are closer to the
reality of competition law enforcement. Depending on whether the enforcement costs
or the assessment errors are the higher variable, the most cost-eﬃcient industry type,
type 1, should be allowed to collude–upper-right cell–or the intermediate marginal
cost type industry should be considered with leniency–lower-left cell in Table 5.
These qualitative insights can be of interest particularly to an competition author-
ity that is constrained by a budget. In the present analysis, any optimal enforcement
level is viable, for the authority does not face any constraint but the self-selection
of the industry types according to the regime the authority determines as optimal.
17 Cf. Mattoo (2001) for a further exploration of this extreme position.
25Often, however, competition authorities have limited means to perform their enforce-
ment tasks with. When the authority has to make choices which industries to police
and in what order, for example, our analysis seems to suggest that it is best to come
down hard on traditional and stable industries, for which enforcement is relatively
inexpensive and sharp, and to be more lenient towards high-pace venture industries.
Only when the latter mature, and seem to be able to sustain their collusive economic
proﬁts is a well-considered and on the mark intervention called for.18
When the authority has various diﬀerent kinds of industries under its control, a
binding budget would make it also consider the trade-oﬀ between handling a few com-
plicated industries well and with great care, so as to reduce assessment errors, only, or
rather take on a large number of cases, in which in each a more substantial error mar-
gin is accepted in exchange. After all, typically there will be a trade-oﬀ between K
and α. Introducing variable investigation costs would allow for the probability of error
to depend on the level of investigation, K. Higher investigation costs in the present
model discourage enforcement of competition law in partial collusion cases–and in
full when very high. If α decreases in K, perfect competition law enforcement could
be a limit case for K suﬃciently high. This allows for a true cost-beneﬁt analysis of
costly, yet less fallible, litigation procedures. Such an endogenous error margin would
facilitate the essentially empirical question what combination of error and costs is
had in what type of industry, and what optimal competition law enforcement goes
with it as a consequence.
Our analysis may also have implications for the organization of competition law
enforcement more generally. In Europe, in the realm of the continuing uniﬁcation
process, member states have either adapted if they had some, or adopted where none
previously existed, competition policy regimes that tailor to EU example. German
competition law, which predates that of the EU and has, in fact, been a source of
inspiration for the latter, connects with the European competition practice quite
naturally. Likewise, Dutch national competition law enforcement is fully in line with
the EU since Holland switched from an ‘abuse legislation’ with little to no intervention
to a European-style prohibition law in January 1998–which initially caused quite a
stir in what used to be referred to as the ‘Netherlands cartel paradise’. Examples of
countries that have recently joined the European Union, however, such as Romania
and Estonia, with no former competition discipline, have in very quick pace designed
complete regulations, with often quite enormous enforcement oﬃces. It seems not
overly skeptical to suspect that these rapid conversions in order to comply with EU
law and be evaluated positively for accession to the union did not deliver ﬂawless
enforcement regimes over-night. And although, coming from a situation with a lax
attitude towards anticompetitive behavior, it clearly is important to show the new
regime will be enforced with rigor, novice competition law enforcement institutions
are warned not to overshoot the mark, triggering the eﬀects addressed in this paper.
On the supra-national level, our ﬁndings are of relevance for a comparison of
18 For a model of budget constrained authorities, see Martin (2000).
26EU and US competition law enforcement. In the EU, competition cases are primar-
ily dealt with under administrative law, with the Directorate General Competition
preparing decisions on behalf of the European Commission. Firms suspected of hav-
ing acted in breach of Article 81(1) of EU competition law can defend themselves in
writing and oral hearings against an issued Statement of Objections, with the possi-
bility of asking for an exemption on one of the grounds made explicit in Article 81(3).
However, whereas Article 81(1) captures all in principle restrictions of competition
for the Commission, the burden of proof to obtain an Article 81(3) exemption in
this two-tier approach is with the parties alleged to have infringed the competition
laws. If one or more of the parties lodges an appeal against an adverse ﬁnding of DG
Competition with the Court of First Instance, there a somewhat more integrated ju-
dicial evaluation of Article 81. Yet, these procedures remain restricted to a superﬁcial
evaluation of the way in which the Commission used its administrative powers. They
do not themselves lead to new investigations into the subject matter of a case. As
a result, European competition law enforcement is likely to be biased towards Type
I errors, thus possibly triggering the precautionary breaches of competition law here
identiﬁed.
In contrast, US antitrust enforcement is based on the DOJ bringing defendants
before a court, which applies the limited set of US competition laws together with
the long history of case law. Also, US merger control is substantially more involved.
Consequently, rather than being required to appeal to a given number of exemption
possibilities, ﬁrms can argue more generally that their notiﬁed merger plans generate
consumer beneﬁts or that any allegation of monopolization against them are unjust.
These civil law proceedings ensure a fair weighing of all possible relevant arguments
early on. As a result, US enforcement is inclined to be more investigatory, with ample
opportunity for appeal and debate, than the EU practice, the more regulatory nature
of which provides less room for rule of reason argumentation. This, in turn, rooted
the US practice in a long tradition of expert witness contributions to litigation, with
academic input often of the highest level.19 Although this certainly makes the US
enforcement system more expensive compared to its European counterpart, it has the
potential beneﬁt of increasing the probability of reaching a proper decision with the
gains pointed out here. There is reason to believe, therefore, that US competition
law enforcement is better directed and less likely to err than EU competition policy,
which relates our analysis to a current debate on the possible convergence between
the two. In order to determine what constitutes a good competition policy regime,
the increased costs of more sophisticated competition law enforcement should be
weighted against the beneﬁts of sound conclusions of law. One of these beneﬁts
is the prevention of strategic anticompetitive acts that result from the presence of
19 On the other hand of course, US critics of competition policy, such as Robert Bork, have
argued against the degree of interpretative freedom left to courts in the US system, holding that
it leads to unsound and inconsistent decisions, requiring lawyers to decide on what are essentially
economic issues. Cf. Bork (1993), Chapter 3.
27enforcement errors.
Appendix: proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . It is ﬁrst shown how the three market structures in the propo-
sition can be implemented most eﬃciently and the corresponding welfare levels determined.
Then it is shown that the other three market structures can either not be implemented, or
never be optimal.









This deters type 1 industries from colluding. Note that this value of β3 also deters
type 2 industries from colluding since π(q3,θ1) >π(q3,θ 2). Substituting the policy
into welfare function (1) gives
W (q1,q 2,q 3)=γ1 [V (q1) − θ1q1]+γ2
·













2. The type 1 partial collusion output (q2,q 2,q 3) can be implemented by setting




Type 2 industries are deterred from producing q3 and type 1 industries are allowed
to produce their most preferred output level. Corresponding welfare is
W (q2,q 2,q 3)=γ1 [V (q2) − θ1q2]+γ2 [V (q2) − θ2q2]
+γ3
·






3. The full collusion output (q2,q 3,q 3) is most eﬃciently implemented by never investi-
gating, that is, β2 = β3 =0 . Welfare follows as
W (q2,q 3,q 3)=γ1 [V (q2) − θ1q2]+γ2 [V (q3) − θ2q3]+γ3 [V (q3) − θ3q3].
Next, it is established that the remaining three production vectors will never be chosen
by the competition authority. First consider the type 2 partial collusive output (q1,q 3,q 3).
It is easily seen that this output can never be implemented, since deterring type 1 industries
from producing q3–by setting β3 ≥
π(q3,θ1)
A –will also deter type 2 industries to produce
28q3,a sπ (q3,θ1) >π (q3,θ2). The two remaining outputs have type 1 industries produce
q3. Although these production levels can be implemented, they can never be welfare max-
imizing, as follows. Consider (q3,q 2,q 3) ﬁrst. It is easily checked that the most eﬃcient
implementation of this output is
β2 =






The corresponding welfare level is given as
W (q3,q 2,q 3)=γ1
µ







V (q2) − θ2q2 −
K
A










It is immediate that W (q3,q 2,q 3) <W(q2,q 2,q 3), eliminating the output (q3,q 2,q 3) as
optimal. Finally, consider the ‘over-collusive’ output (q3,q 3,q 3). This can never be optimal,
since the cost free policy β2 = β3 =0will lead to the output (q2,q 3,q 3), which generates
a higher welfare level than (q3,q 3,q 3),e v e ni ft h el a t t e ro u t c o m ec o u l db ei m p l e m e n t e da t
zero cost–which it cannot.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let Ψa be deﬁned as K
A ≤ Ψa ⇔ W (q1,q 2,q 3) ≥
W (q2,q 2,q 3).A n a l o g o u s l y ,l e tΨb be deﬁned by K
A ≤ Ψb ⇔ W (q1,q 2,q 3) ≥ W (q2,q 3,q 3)
and let Ψc be deﬁned by K
A ≤ Ψc ⇔ W (q2,q 2,q 3) ≥ W (q2,q 3,q 3). From Proposition (1) it
follows that:
Ψa =
γ1 ([V (q1) − θ1q1] − [V (q2) − θ1q2])
γ2π(q2,θ1)+γ3 [π(q3,θ1) − π(q3,θ2)]
,
Ψb =




γ2 ([V (q2) − θ2q2] − [V (q3) − θ2q3])
γ3π(q3,θ 2)
.
Quite tedious, but fairly straightforward algebra allows for checking that the only possible
ways in which these three numbers can be ordered are the two considered in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. First it is shown how the four outputs in the proposition
can be most eﬃciently implemented and the corresponding welfare levels determined. Then
it will be shown that the other two possible outputs can never be optimal.














29Welfare follows as W (q1,q 2,q 3)=
γ1 [V (q1) − θ1q1]+γ2
·



























W (q2,q 2,q 3)=γ1 [V (q2) − θ1q2]+γ2 [V (q2) − θ2q2]
+γ3
·
















to deter type 1 industries from colluding. Furthermore, in order to allow type 2





Clearly, β2 should be smaller than or equal to 1, which requires α ≥ α∗.T h eﬁnal
implementation now is









with corresponding welfare level
W (q1,q 3,q 3)=γ1 [V (q1) − θ1q1]+γ2
·

















4. The policy β2 = β3 =0implements the fully collusive output and welfare
W (q2,q 3,q 3)=γ1 [V (q2) − θ1q2]+γ2 [V (q3) − θ2q3]+γ3 [V (q3) − θ3q3]
is attained.
30Finally, it is shown that the remaining outputs (q3,q 2,q 3) and (q3,q 3,q 3) can never be
optimal. It is easily seen that the most eﬃcient way to implement (q3,q 2,q 3) is by
β2 =






resulting in a welfare level of W (q3,q 2,q 3)=
γ1
·


























That (q3,q 3,q 3) cannot be optimal is immediate from noting that the policy β2 = β3 =0
returns the fully collusive output with higher welfare.
































































a =( 1 − α)Ψa;
Ψ
α
a =( 1 − α)
2 γ1 ([V (q1) − θ1q1] − [V (q2) − θ1q2])
((1 − α)γ2 + αγ3)π(q2,θ1)
;
Ψα
b =( 1 − α)Ψb;
Ψ
α
b =( 1 − α)







c =( 1 − α)Ψc;
Ψα
d =( 1 − α)
V (q2) − θ2q2 − [V (q3) − θ2q3]




d =( 1 − α)






− (γ2 + γ3)π(q3,θ1)
;
Ψα
e =( 1 − α)
γ1 ([V (q1) − θ1q1] − [V (q2) − θ1q2]) − γ2 ([V (q2) − θ2q2] − [V (q3) − θ2q3])
γ2π(q3,θ1)+γ3 (π(q3,θ1) − π (q3,θ2))
;
Ψα
f =( 1 − α)
γ1
1 − γ1
[V (q1) − θ1q1] − [V (q2) − θ1q2]
π(q3,θ1)
.
The result for α<α ∗∗ follows straightforwardly. Now consider the case where α>α ∗∗.








d. T h el a s tn u m b e rc a nb es k i p p e db y













Proof of Proposition 5. For (q1,q 3,q 3) to be optimal, it is necessary that K
A
is larger than Ψα
d but smaller than Ψα
e and Ψα
f. First consider α<α ∗∗. In order for an
interval of K





For α ≤ α∗∗ these inequalities reduce to
γ1 ≥
γ2 (π(q2,θ 1)+π(q3,θ2) − π(q3,θ1)) + (π(q3,θ 1) − π(q3,θ2))
(π(q2,θ1) − π (q3,θ1))
V (q1)−θ1q1−[V (q2)−θ1q2]






π(q2,θ 1) − π(q3,θ1)
V (q2) − θ2q2 − [V (q3) − θ2q3]
V (q1) − θ1q1 − [V (q2) − θ1q2]
.
Note that there always exist a γ1 satisfying these inequalities (as can be veriﬁed by letting
γ1 approach 1). Now consider α>α ∗∗. It is easily veriﬁed that Ψ
α
d ≤ Ψα
d for α ≥ α∗∗.
Hence the above conditions also suﬃce for the case α>α ∗∗. The interval of K
A values for
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